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ABSTRACT 
Decisions to invest in information technology (IT) infrastructure are often made based on an assessment 
of its immediate value to the organization.  However, an important source of value comes from the fact 
that such technologies have the potential to be leveraged in the development of future applications.  From 
a real options perspective, IT infrastructure investments create growth options that can be 
exercised if and when an organization decides to develop systems to provide new or enhanced IT 
capabilities.  We present an analytical model based on real options that shows the process by 
which this potential is converted into business value.  In this context, we discuss middleware as 
an example technology because it delivers shared and reliable IT services that enable the 
development of future IT applications.  We derive managerial implications for the evaluation of 
IT infrastructure investments and how business value is determined by demand uncertainty and 
market competition, as well as by the IT infrastructure-driven cost advantage of the firm relative 
to its competitors.  The findings of this research are: (1) the flexibility provided by IT 
infrastructure investment is more valuable when uncertainty is higher; (2) the cost advantage that 
IT infrastructure investment brings about is amplified by demand volatility for IT-supported 
products and services; (3) in duopoly competition, the value of IT infrastructure flexibility 
increases with the level of product or service substitutability; and (4) when demand volatility is 
high, inter-firm competition has a lower impact on the value of IT infrastructure.  
KEYWORDS: Business value, capital budgeting, financial analysis, flexibility, IT investments, 
IT infrastructure, middleware technologies, option pricing, real options, systems integration.  
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INTRODUCTION  
Industry observers recognize that information technologies (IT) can deliver substantial value 
to firms that invest wisely.   However, senior managers in many organizations complain about 
how difficult it is to evaluate IT investments and to gauge the value that they create.  As a result, 
many leading IS researchers have been searching for a definitive means to scientifically assess 
the business value of IT investments and to standardize the methodologies that support 
managerial analysis.  In a survey of over 500 leading companies, InformationWeek reported that 
senior managers were looking for better ways to understand and measure the benefits of IT 
investments, and nearly 95% were required to measure returns on IT investments (D’Antoni, 
2003).   We address this issue by providing a disciplined analysis of the value-generating 
capabilities of IT infrastructure investments (Panayi and Trigeorgis, 1998).  We adopt a real 
options approach to gain an understanding of how infrastructure creates value and apply 
economic modeling techniques to reveal the business value of IT infrastructure investments. 
The results of IT value research have been mixed (Chan, 2000).  Roach (1991) reports a lack 
of productivity improvement with increasing organizational investments in IT.  But Hitt and 
Brynjolfsson (1996) find that IT investment increases both productivity and consumer value, 
although firm profitability does not increase.  Thatcher and Oliver (2001) demonstrate that IT 
investments made to reduce fixed costs increase productivity, but IT investments made to reduce 
variable costs increase firm profitability.  Other studies emphasize a process-oriented view that 
reveals the path from IT investment to its locus of business value within the firm.  Among them, 
Barua, et al. (1995) find only partial support for the hypothesized positive impacts of various 
inputs, including IT, on intermediate variables related to the production of goods and services.   
Related studies (e.g., Devaraj and Kohli, 2003; Kekre and Mukhopadhyay, 2002; 
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Mukhopadhyay, et al., 1997) are similarly equivocal in their assessments of IT value.    
A reason for these inconclusive findings is the difficulty of measuring the value of IT 
investments (Brynjolfsson, 1993).  The benefits of IT infrastructure investments are indirect and 
long-term (Renkema, 2000).  So they are often assessed by conjecture, with reference to other 
analogous IT investments (Duncan, 1995).  IT infrastructure is listed in CIO Magazine 
(www.cio.com) and Computerworld (www.computerworld.com) as a top management concern 
due to its impact on firms’ efforts to achieve competitive advantage. A majority of IT 
expenditures in most organizations actually relate to infrastructure (Weill and Broadbent, 1998).  
So how IT infrastructure creates business value is important.   
We apply a real options perspective to analyze the value of IT infrastructures, especially the 
strategic value that a company can obtain by investing ahead of its competition.  We first 
describe IT infrastructure as resources that offer a foundation for future applications.  
Recognizing that IT infrastructure investment generates value through enabling future 
applications for IT-supported products or services, we conceptualize the investment as creating 
growth options and develop a framework for the valuation process (Kester, 1984).  Using 
elements from prior literature (e.g., Barua, et al., 1991; Zhu and Weyant, 2003), we develop a 
formal model with real options thinking for the evaluation of IT infrastructure.  We emphasize 
the sequential nature of IT infrastructure investment, demand uncertainty, the possibility of 
skewed demand, and the effects of market competition.  We conclude with our contributions and 
a discussion of the managerial implications of this research.    
IT INFRASTRUCTURE AS A SOURCE OF VALUE 
IT infrastructure provides the shared and long-term organizational IT resources that 
constitute a foundation for present and future business applications (Duncan, 1995; Weill and 
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Broadbent, 1998, p. 26).  IT infrastructure comprises IT physical assets, IT intellectual assets, 
and IT-related procedural assets (Bharadwaj, 2000; Kayworth, et al., 2001).  IT physical assets 
are the basic technical components shared across units of a firm.  These include firm-wide 
technical platforms, common architectures, networks and databases.  IT intellectual assets are 
IT-related knowledge, expertise and management of technology skills that exist in the firm.  IT-
related procedural assets are rules that specify how other IT assets are evaluated, acquired, 
constructed, implemented, utilized, enhanced and replaced.  IT standards, for example, are 
procedural assets; they set up rules for system design and development.   
A key capability of IT infrastructure is flexibility (Kulatilaka and Marks, 1998), the ability to 
support hardware, software, and networking technologies across a portfolio of systems 
capabilities, and to extend functionalities and capacities.  Flexibility makes it feasible for a firm 
to create IT-based business innovations at a lower cost than its competition because the firm can 
adapt its systems and business processes to accommodate changing conditions cost-effectively 
(Duncan, 1995).  A flexible IT infrastructure creates the basis for organizational innovativeness 
to rapidly develop or enhance products or services in a competitive market (Kayworth, et al., 
2001).  This potential value can be converted to real business value when management exploits 
the flexibility of the infrastructure to develop new resources.  The associations between IT 
infrastructure, IT applications, and organizational capabilities are shown in Figure 1.  
With an appropriate IT infrastructure, a firm can quickly add functionality to its core systems 
to meet market demands, refine the handling of data across systems to comply with new 
regulations, or link its systems with those of other firms.  Delta Airlines’ experience offers an 
example (Ross and Beath, 2002).  Delta committed to a three-year project to build a shared data 
environment that integrated data on flights, customers, crews, equipment and baggage, so they 
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were made available simultaneously to the appropriate parties.  Later, Delta developed a new 
application to support its customer boarding business process.  It leveraged the centralized flight 
and customer databases built up in the infrastructure project.  The new boarding system 
streamlined the existing business process, leading to more efficient customer services (Ross and 
Beath, 2002).  In other cases, infrastructure investment is explicitly targeted at building 
capabilities to support future demand.  For example, the adoption of Web services at Danske 
Bank of Denmark was partly motivated by the ability that Web services provide to deliver new 
and complex product packages when they are needed for the marketplace (Sliwa 2003).  In such 
cases, the “true value” of a firm’s IT infrastructure can only be determined by resolving 
uncertainties that the firm has about the range of future needs that its infrastructure must address.   
Figure 1.  Present IT Infrastructure and Future Applications 
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One important component of IT infrastructure is middleware services, which are “generic 
services across applications and industries [which] run on multiple platforms, are distributed, and 
support standard interfaces and protocols” (Bernstein 1996, p. 89).  We view middleware 
services as a component in the IT infrastructure structure suggested by Weill and Broadbent 
(1998) because middleware delivers shared services throughout a firm that become part of the 
foundation for other IT applications.  Over the years, middleware technologies and products have 
been advancing quickly as an important part of distributed computing platforms.  For example, 
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DCOM and COM+ are deployed with Microsoft’s products, Enterprise JavaBeans (EJB) 
provides a component architecture based on the J2EE platform, and CORBA is promoted by the 
Object Management Group (OMG).  These technologies and products exhibit the basic 
capability of middleware: to provide interfaces and architecture for application developers to 
leverage common computing resources and to integrate application components that comply with 
certain interoperability requirements (Agha 2002).     
For example, IBM’s San Francisco Project yielded a proposal for a framework with three 
basic layers (Bobrer, et al., 1998).  Its “foundation layer” is basically an object request broker, 
providing object modeling classes and application utilities.  The top layer consists of business 
process components that incorporate specific business logic.  The middle layer provides 
interfaces and mappings that enable developers of different top layer components to use the 
common foundation layer.  Thus an organization can easily integrate functional applications 
purchased from any vendor whose software conforms to the specified framework. 
Middleware technologies make organizational systems more scalable in capacity and 
functionality terms.  Such scalability manifests itself in the flexibility of middleware 
technologies as IT infrastructure.  For example, Wells Fargo Bank developed a customer 
relationship system by integrating disparate systems for different customer accounts which was 
supported by an object-oriented middleware technology (OMG, 2004).  Later, the bank 
leveraged this architecture to provide additional applications that enhanced its services including 
access from the bank's “Interactive Voice Response Unit,” automated teller machines, Internet 
banking and bill payment services.   
In summary, IT infrastructures are shared enterprise IT resources, offering foundations for 
future development that are the source for organizational responsiveness and innovativeness.    
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The scalability and flexibility for future opportunities distinguish infrastructures from non-
infrastructure assets such as local business applications (Weill and Broadbent, 1998).  Also 
infrastructure investments bring in value that may be realized through implementing IT 
applications enabled by the infrastructure.  Non-infrastructure investments create value mainly 
from applications.  Implementing flexible IT infrastructures enables a firm to develop 
applications at lower costs (Ross and Beath, 2002).    
In this sense, an IT infrastructure investment creates growth options which can be 
appropriately evaluated with options analysis, just as Delta Airlines gained capabilities to 
develop a new boarding system and Wells Fargo Bank built up an architecture that was to be 
leveraged for additional customer services.  Once these companies invested in the new 
applications to offer new or enhanced services, they were able to attract more customers who 
would bring in more revenues.  In addition to growth options, IT infrastructure may also create 
other opportunities for management.  For example, the infrastructure embeds switching options if 
it enables management to change applications or move to systems from different vendors.  
Option analysis enables management to capture the business value of future opportunities.  We 
offer a more detailed discussion of how real options thinking can help senior managers 
understand the value of IT infrastructure investments.   
OPTIONS THINKING AND IT INFRASTRUCTURE CAPABILITIES 
In this section, we review and apply real options thinking to IT infrastructure investments.   
The Real Options Perspective 
An option gives the right but not the obligation to its owner to take relevant actions in the 
future (Hull, 1996).  Trigeorgis (1996) emphasizes managerial flexibility in uncertain investment 
environments, and develops the real options perspective for analyzing corporate budgeting and 
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resource allocation decisions.  This perspective offers a means to assess the potential value of an 
infrastructure or a technology platform investment, whose value comes mainly from future 
growth opportunities.  Such value can be flexibly “unlocked” by future investments, enabling 
infrastructure capabilities to be turned into real assets (Amram and Kulatilaka, 1998; Sumit and 
Ankum, 1993; Trigeorgis, 1996). This bridges organizational competencies and market 
positioning strategies for effective managerial decision making and risk analysis (Kumar, 1996; 
Benaroch, 2002; Kogut and Kulatilaka, 2002; Kulatilaka and Marks, 1998; Schwartz and 
Sozaya-Gorstiza, 2003).  It also creates an analytical basis for achieving appropriate timing of 
managerial actions that relate to technology adoption within the firm (Kauffman and Li, 2005).   
Management holds a real option when an initial investment creates an opportunity for future 
value-bearing investment, but the firm is not required to make it.  The value of the investment 
option comes from the expected benefits of the underlying asset obtained if the future investment 
is made.  The value of the underlying asset is stochastic, and thus the market setting in which its 
value is realized will significantly affect the value of the option.    
The real options perspective has been applied to assess the potential business value of IT 
investments (Dos Santos, 1991; Cheung and Bagranoff, 1991; Kambil, et al., 1993).  Benaroch 
and Kauffman (1999) provide foundational arguments about the extent to which assets that are 
not traded in the market may still be conceptualized in real options terms.  Taudes, et al. (2000) 
suggest that options pricing models may be used for justifying IT platform investments, such as 
SAP R/3.  Kumar (1999) develops a framework that is intended to aid in understanding decision 
support system value.  Clemons and Gu (2003) study the IT investment strategy of a credit card 
issuer when there is little historical information for variance estimates of future revenue and cost 
flows.  Sambamurthy, et al. (2003) conceptualize IT-enabled capabilities as options which 
  
8
impact organizational agility in exploiting future business opportunities.  
Analyzing IT Infrastructure Investments from the Real Options Perspective 
Our present work embeds option-theoretic concepts in an optimization model.  We 
emphasize three aspects: competitive adaptability for IT infrastructure decision making, path-
dependent choices about future IT resources that will be value-bearing, and assessments about 
the influence of market uncertainty on the value of the decisions.  First, by acquiring flexibility 
in its IT infrastructure, a firm is able to develop new IT resources to respond to market changes, 
which enhances the potential future business value of the firm (Kayworth, et al., 2001).  IT 
infrastructure flexibility provides growth options for the firm that will allow it to adapt and 
extend some of its key systems to compete more effectively in future markets.  IT infrastructure 
investment evaluation should account for the future benefits that the firm obtains from owning 
such options—in addition to the immediate benefits derived.  We refer to the benefits that the 
firm obtains from holding the investment option as the real option value of the IT investment.   
Second, the real option value is realized when new IT resources are implemented, for 
example, to capture customer demand or provide enhanced decision making capabilities.  By IT 
resources, we refer to physical IT assets (including computer hardware, software, and networks), 
and IT intellectual assets (e.g., skills and knowledge).  The future IT resources that become 
possible with earlier IT investments are the underlying assets of IT infrastructure flexibility.  
Assessing value must begin with the future IT resources that can be developed at a lower cost 
based on the planned IT infrastructure (Duncan, 1995).    
Third, real options thinking emphasizes market uncertainty for valuing the underlying asset.  
An assessment of the business value of an IT infrastructure project should consider value drivers 
such as demand uncertainty or the intensity of competition, over some appropriate time horizon 
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(Zhu and Weyant, 2003).  Real options thinking links IT infrastructure capabilities value with the 
dynamics of the market in which the firm competes, how customer demand materializes for its 
products or services, the ways in which the firm’s strategy and tactics are implemented, and how 
its industry is regulated.  Table 1 summarizes six basic concepts related to this perspective.       
Table 1.  Evaluating IT Infrastructure from a Real Options Perspective 
OPTION CONCEPT APPLICATION TO IT RESOURCES 
Option The ability to develop business applications enabled by an IT infrastructure 
that enables a firm to effectively respond to demand changes in its marketplace 
Underlying asset The possible IT resources (e.g., business applications) that can be built upon a 
specific IT infrastructure 
Value of the 
underlying asset 
The business value of possible IT applications to improve the service or 
product offerings of a firm, leading to higher profitability 
Market volatility Demand uncertainty for product or service offerings made possible by follow-
on applications in the IT infrastructure; affects value of underlying asset 
Exercise price Expenditures associated with investment in follow-on IT applications 
Option price Expenditures associated with investing in a specific IT infrastructure 
Time to expiration Period of time from owning the IT infrastructure to when the follow-on IT 
investment opportunity runs out due to competition, regulation, technological 
advancement or demand changes, etc.  
The ability to develop future applications is the real option that management obtains from 
owning the IT infrastructure.  The underlying asset is the future IT resources made possible by 
that IT infrastructure.  Accordingly, the value of the underlying asset comes from the value these 
applications will generate if they are implemented.  Additional investment is required to 
implement these follow-on applications.  This is analogous to the option exercise price.  As an 
option’s value varies with the volatility of its underlying asset, the value of a given IT 
infrastructure investment varies with the demand for the future business applications enabled by 
the IT infrastructure.  Finally, the investment itself is analogous to the option price that a 
decision maker is willing to pay to hold the option.  The price should balance the uncertainties 
for the stochastic benefits and costs.  Our analysis shows how to evaluate IT infrastructure 
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investments by using real option methods suited to gauging the value of future business 
applications enabled by the infrastructure and the relevant sources of uncertainty for value.   
EVALUATING IT INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT WITH REAL OPTIONS 
Financial option pricing models are used to evaluate investments that involve environmental 
uncertainty and irreversible managerial decisions (e.g., Sick, 1989; Hull, 1996; Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1994).  This approach can value the impacts of unobservable future changes on value 
streams associated with various types of investments.  These include drilling oil wells (Smith and 
McCardle, 1999), buying capacity for airline operations, and determining optimal investment 
levels for plant and equipment for firms operating in cyclical markets (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).    
There is a second stream of research that incorporates options thinking in cost-benefit 
analysis.  It permits the analysis of real options in the context of corporate strategy (e.g., Amram 
and Kulatilaka, 1999; Kulatilaka and Perotti, 1998; Kogut and Kulatilaka, 2001; Luehrman, 
1998a and 1998b).  We leverage the second stream, but apply a formal modeling approach to 
create a normative understanding of how IT infrastructure investments should be evaluated.  We 
do this by considering current and future costs and benefits as well as market factors influencing 
these costs and benefits.  Although IT investment decisions may involve choices between 
different technologies (for example, COM+ and EJB) our analysis does not address such choices 
per se.  Rather we emphasize the evaluation of IT infrastructure in general.  Hence our approach 
can be applied to a broad range of investments including middleware technology, data 
warehousing technology, programming environments, or communications infrastructure. 
Model Setup 
We construct a model that considers relationships among the factors we have discussed to 
guide future improvements in decision making relative to option value-bearing IT infrastructure 
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investments.   In Stage 1, a firm invests in an IT project to implement an IT infrastructure 
technology with an initial cost of K.  (See Table 2 for the modeling notation.)  This cost includes 
the expenditures that the company has to bear in obtaining the hardware, software, telecomm and 
skills required for deploying and operating the infrastructure.  It varies with existing IT assets 
that the firm owns, especially its IT platforms.  For example, a company with Microsoft 
platforms in place should have a lower cost (a smaller K) in adopting COM+ than if it switches 
to EJB.  In other words, existing IT platforms affect future IT infrastructure investments via 
different initial costs.  The company may make the investment in a lump sum or by prototyping 
or some other means.  Our model represents the total cost for owning the infrastructure as K.  If 
the infrastructure project generates a direct benefit, this benefit is deducted from K.  If the direct 
benefit from this project does not cover its investment costs in Stage 1, then we expect K > 0.   
With the IT infrastructure implemented in Stage 1, the firm is able to provide a desired 
product or service in Stage 2 by developing additional IT resources, which creates a growth 
option.  Developing these new IT resources typically requires follow-on investment (in the 
application, in the infrastructure, or in both).  This is analogous to what investors must pay to 
exercise call options on stocks to balance risk and returns in portfolio management. 
Now suppose that at Stage 2, the firm desires to provide a product or service with an attribute 
level s, for example, a criterion level of quality for the business.  For instance, Delta Airlines 
decided to invest in new applications to improve its boarding process, and Wells Fargo Bank 
offered Internet banking services to its customers, leveraging the infrastructure they built in 
previous projects.  The firm must bear fixed costs that are increasing in the attribute level, f s2, 
and variable costs, cd, that are scaled by demand d.   f and c are cost constants.  To facilitate 
discussion, we hereafter use s to refer to product or service quality level.   
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The fixed cost term, fs2, indicates that enhancing the quality level becomes increasingly 
difficult as the quality level increases.  Such quadratic forms have often been used in managerial 
economics to model the costs in production and the optimization of production in the firm, as 
discussed by Simon (1978) in his Nobel Prize lecture.  This assumption has been adopted by IS 
researchers to study the impacts of IT investments relative to product quality and competition 
through quality (Barua, et al., 1991; Thatcher and Oliver, 2001; Thatcher and Pingry, 2004). 
Table 2. Notation Used in the Option Model  
NOTATION DEFINITION 
a1,…,a7 Parameters for deriving the second stage profit with skewed demand 
c  Constant variable cost for offering the desired product or service at Stage 2 
d  Demand for the product or service offered at Stage 2 
f  Constant fixed cost for offering the desired product or service at Stage 2 
G(θ) Expected value of the IT infrastructure, based on stochastic demand, θ 
K Investment cost for developing IT infrastructure at Stage 1 
p  Price for the product or service offered at Stage 2 
s  Attribute level (e.g., quality level) of the product or service offered at Stage 2 
z  Cross-elasticity factor, representing interfirm competition in non-IT areas 
πINVESTMENT Profit at Stage 2 when firm invests in the IT infrastructure at Stage 1 
πNOINVESTMENT Profit at Stage 2 when firm does not invest in the IT infrastructure at Stage 1 
VINVESTMENT(θ) Expected value of IT investment when firm invests in IT infrastructure at Stage 1 
VNOINVESTMENT(θ) Expected value of overall IT investments when firm does not invest in IT infrastructure 
at Stage 1 
θ Stochastic portion of demand for product or service. Interpreted as the degree to which 
customer desires a one unit increase in the attribute level (θ  > 0) 
θ0 Expected value of demand, θ 
σ2 Demand variance of demand, θ 
θ1 In the base case, level of customer desire for the product attribute, above which the 
firm can gain a positive profit at Stage 2 by offering the product, given that it invested 
in IT infrastructure at Stage 1 
θ1’ In the base case, the level of customer desire for the product attribute, above which the 
firm can gain a positive profit at Stage 2 by offering the product, given that it did not 
invest in the IT infrastructure at Stage 1 
θ2 In the duopoly case, the level of customer desire for the product attribute, above which 
both firms can gain a positive profit at Stage 2 by offering the product, given that one 
firm invests in the IT infrastructure at Stage 1 
θ3 In the duopoly case, the level of customer desire for the product attribute, above which 
both firms can gain a positive profit at Stage 2 by offering the product, given that 
neither firm invests in the IT infrastructure at Stage 1 
λ Cost advantage of the IT infrastructure (λ >1) 
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If the firm does not implement the IT infrastructure in Stage 1, then it will bear higher costs 
to reach quality level s.  Also, if the firm waits until the second period to invest, then it will face 
a penalty cost for not having the infrastructure capabilities.  Since time is costly, the penalty cost 
includes the extra time, costs and human resources required to offer the product or service at 
Stage 2.  We represent the effect of delaying IT infrastructure investment by increasing the fixed 
cost by a factor of λ >1 to λ f s2.  This cost advantage measures how the infrastructure can be 
leveraged to develop necessary new applications at Stage 2, which is captured as cost savings 
that the firm can enjoy with the infrastructure capabilities in place.  The more the firm can 
exploit the infrastructure capabilities, the more it benefits from Stage 1 investment and the bigger 
the value of λ.  This cost advantage may also be affected by the extent to which the infrastructure 
technology has advanced from Stage 1 to Stage 2.  Technological advancement tends to lower 
the value of the infrastructure obtained in a previous period, which reduces the magnitude of λ.   
We assume linear demand d = θ s - p for future IT-enabled products or services. θ  is the 
stochastic portion of demand for the product or service with quality level s.  This measures the 
degree to which the customer desires a one unit increase in the quality level of the product or 
service with price p.  We also assume that demand increases with the quality level, so that θ  > 0.    
The firm faces the following demand and cost functions if it implements the infrastructure:  
Demand:   d = θ s - p             (1) 
Investment costs:   K        (for IT infrastructure investment at Stage 1)                      (2) 
            f s2+ c d  (cost of providing product or service with the attribute level s with IT            
                   IT infrastructure at Stage 2 given an investment in IT infrastructure at Stage 1)      (3) 
We assume that firms are price takers, and decide on the quality level of the IT-enabled 
product or service in order to maximize profits.  The cost coefficients f, c, and λ are constant 
ratios that can be estimated, and are not stochastic.  We consider one IT-enabled product or 
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service at Stage 2, and one product attribute.  We focus on growth options from IT infrastructure, 
even though it may create other options for management, such as switching options.   
With IT Infrastructure Investment in Stage 1 
If the firm invests in the infrastructure at Stage 1, it can obtain a profit at Stage 2  as 
πINVESTMENT= -f s2+ (p – c)θ s + p c – p2.   As a price taker, the firm decides on the quality level s 
of the product or service it offers.  The first order condition for maximizing the above profit 
function leads to an optimal quality level to be selected by the firm θ
f
cps
2
* −= .  Under this 
quality level, the optimal profit for making the Stage 2 IT infrastructure investment is 
f
cpfpcpINVESTMENT
4
)(4)( 22* −−−= θπ .  
Management can decide whether to exploit the infrastructure to provide a higher quality 
level, depending on profitability.  The firm will make a follow-on investment at Stage 2 only 
when it can earn positive profit, i.e., πINVESTMENT*≥ 0.  Otherwise, it will defer.   Thus the profit at 
Stage 2 with Stage 1 IT infrastructure investment becomes:  
  
      ;
4
)(4)(
                                          ;0
1
22
1
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
≥−−−
<
= θθθ
θθ
π
f
cpfpcpINVESTMENT                                                            (4) 
where 
cp
fp
−=
4
1θ .   This indicates that the firm gains a positive return on the follow-on IT 
investment at Stage 2 if demand for quality exceeds a certain level, θ1.  Only when the 
customers’ desire for the quality exceeds the level represented by θ1 does the firm find the Stage 
2 investment to be profitable and, thus, will it be willing to make a follow-on investment.   
Consequently, the expected value of the overall IT investment, VINVESTMENT(θ), is given by:  
   KprobEV INVESTMENTINVESTMENT −≥⋅≥= )()|()( 11 θθθθπθ                                         (5) 
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So when the demand for enhanced quality of product or service reaches a “certain” level (which 
must  be discovered by the decision maker), it becomes profitable for the firm to invest at Stage 
2 to leverage the Stage 1 infrastructure and develop more applications to meet the demand.   
No IT Infrastructure Investment in Stage 1   
If the firm does not implement at Stage 1, it faces a different cost function.  The demand 
function is the same (d = θ s - p), the cost of IT infrastructure implementation at Stage 1 goes to 
0, and the Stage 2 quality level s costs are increased by λ without the Stage 1 IT infrastructure: 
λ f s2+ c d          (cost of providing quality level s with IT infrastructure only at Stage 2)  (6) 
The firm, as a price taker, will choose a quality level to gain optimal profit at Stage 2.  As 
above, its Stage 2 investment decision will be conditioned on whether customer demand for the 
product or service quality, θ, goes beyond a base level.  The base level demand is different from 
when the firm invests at Stage 1: 
cp
fp
−=
λθ 4'1 .  The firm’s profit at Stage 2 becomes:  
               
      ;
4
)(4)(
                                          ;0
'
1
22
'
1
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
≥−−−
<
= θθλ
λθ
θθ
π
f
cpfpcpNTNOINVESTME                                  (7) 
and the expected value of IT investment without the Stage 1 infrastructure, VNOINVESTMENT(θ), is: 
           )()|()( '1
'
1 θθθθπθ ≥⋅≥= probEV NTNOINVESTMENTNOINVESTME                  (8) 
We show the investment decision in Figure 2.  (The derivation details are in the Appendix.) 
The expected value of IT infrastructure, G(θ), is the difference between the expected value 
with the IT infrastructure and without it (similar to how information value is computed):  
 )()()( θθθ NTNOINVESTMEINVESTMENT VVG −=      (9) 
When G(θ) = 0, the firm will be indifferent to investing in Stage 1.  G(θ) > 0 indicates that 
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the IT infrastructure investment will create positive value, while G(θ) < 0 indicates it will not. 
Figure 2. Firm IT Infrastructure Investment Decision 
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ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
We next analyze the factors that affect the value of the growth option in our model.        
Distribution of Demand 
We assume the demand for new IT-enabled products or services represented by θ is log-
normally distributed with expected value E(θ) = θ0, and with demand variance σ 2:  
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ − 220 ,2
1)ln(~)ln( σσθθ N ,                                                                                          (10) 
With a log-normal distribution, we expect to observe more lower values of θ.  The log-
normal distribution is widely used (e.g., Kulatilaka and Perotti, 1998; Panayi and Trigeorgis, 
1998).  A log-normal θ has two implications for demand: (1) a customer’s estimate of value of 
the product or service is always positive, indicating its desirability and (2) a small portion of the 
customers will value the product or service more highly than the majority of the customers.    
The Monopoly Case 
Consider the case when the company does not face competition for the IT-enabled product or 
service in Stage 2.  The profit functions are represented by Equations 4 and 7.  The value 
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functions are derived below. 
Value Functions.  Plugging Equation 4 and the above log-normal distribution of θ into 
Equation 5, we derive the value function for Firm 1 when it makes infrastructure investment at 
Stage 1, VINVESTMENT(θ0,σ).  This is shown in Equation 11.  (See the Appendix for a derivation.)   
 ,)()()(
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cpV INVESTMENT −Φ⋅−−Φ⋅−= σθσθ                        (11)                
where σ
σθθ
2
3)ln( 2210
1
+=a  ,  σ212 −= aa ,  and Φ(●) is the cumulative density function 
(CDF) of the standard normal distribution.  Similarly, we derive the value function for Firm 1 
when it does not make infrastructure investment, VNOINVESTMENT(θ0,σ).  (See Appendix also.) 
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where σ
σθθ
2
3)ln( 22'10
3
+=a , σ234 −= aa  , and Φ(●) is the standard normal CDF.  
How does the expected value of the IT infrastructure, represented by G(θ), change with cost 
advantage λ and market volatility σ ?  Consider a numeric example.  We normalize the costs by 
setting f = c = 1, and set K = 3, p = 2, and θ0 = 5.  The value of G(θ) is shown in Figure 3.   
Demand Volatility and Infrastructure Value.  The value of G(θ) is larger with more 
market volatility.  So the greater the variance of customer preferences for the newly-enabled 
product or service, the more valuable the investment in the IT infrastructure will be.  This is 
consistent with Hull (1996): the option value increases with the volatility of the underlying asset.  
The rationale is that when demand variance for the product or service is large, the firm can 
expect a great value when uncertainty is resolved.  So it is beneficial to invest in the 
infrastructure that enables the product or service to be offered later.  The value comes from the 
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flexibility to pursue follow-on projects.  As a result, the firm can take advantage of the 
investment opportunity when it is profitable, and avoid it when the payoff is unacceptable. 
Figure 3.  Interaction Effect of Cost Advantage, Market Volatility on Infrastructure Value 
 
Note: The sensitivity analysis is based on the parameters: K = 3, f = 1, p = 2, c = 1, and θ0 = 5.    
This implies that management should estimate market demand trends for IT-enabled products 
and services and incorporate their business value into the assessment of IT infrastructure 
investment.  When there is a potential of a high demand for future IT-enabled products or 
services, firms have a great incentive to invest in a supporting IT infrastructure that enables them 
to develop new software functionality, products and services in the future, even if there is 
uncertainty in the market.  This explains the rationale that banks used in the mid-1990s, as they 
started to make decisions about adopting ORB middleware technologies.   The major drivers are 
to offer, expand and upgrade online banking services as demand evolves.  For example, in 1996 
when online banking was still in its infancy, Bank of America chose CORBA (common object 
request broker architecture) to support the development of its Creditcard Online system to offer 
credit card account information via the Internet because the company felt this architecture 
delivered the scalability necessary for handling a large volume of users and data that would be 
needed once the demand for online banking grew beyond the current levels (Patrizio, 1996).  
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Managers noticed the growth potential of online banking services even though there was 
uncertainty in the demand at that time.  This growth potential made the distributed object 
computing architecture valuable.    
The result has important implications for risk management.  Variance in demand is 
recognized as a source of risk, and a project with a payoff of a high variance is typically viewed 
to be a high risk investment.  We offer an alternative perspective.  Since such a project will offer 
a large return if the demand is high, the firm should prepare for the possible opportunity by 
building the necessary infrastructure capabilities to obtain the option to develop the applications 
required for the project in future, should favorable conditions arise.  Figure 3 indicates that an 
investment in IT infrastructure that enables this risky project is highly valuable.  Management 
should make the investment to retain the option of developing the related applications.  This way 
it can be exercised or not when uncertainty about demand is resolved.   
Interaction between Demand Volatility and Cost Advantage.  The results in Figure 3 also 
show an important insight that is not investigated in standard analysis: the volatility of demand 
that affects the payoff stream tends to amplify the cost advantage associated with Stage 1 
investment through the interaction of these two factors.  Although the cost advantage at Stage 2 
increases the value of the IT infrastructure investment, it makes little difference when the 
demand volatility is low.  In Figure 3, we observe that as demand volatility σ  goes up, the value 
of the IT infrastructure investment, G(θ), increases across a range of cost advantages, λ.  For 
example, when σ  = 0.2, the value of G(θ) increases by just 3.07 (from –2.3 to 0.77) when the 
cost advantage λ increases from 1.1 to 2.5.  But when σ  = 1.5, the value of G(θ) changes from 
2.37 to 32.35 when λ increases from 1.1 to 2.5.  So the cost benefit that the infrastructure brings 
to the future project is larger when market demand is more uncertain.  Thus, when there are 
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alternative infrastructure technologies, the cost advantages that different infrastructures can bring 
should be carefully assessed and compared when highly volatile demand is expected.      
Figure 3 also shows that when the firm operates in markets with high demand volatility, IT 
infrastructure investments will still be highly valued even if the cost advantage is small.  For 
example, when the cost advantage is low at λ = 1.1, the firm can save about 10% of the follow-
on investment at Stage 2 if it invests in the IT infrastructure at Stage 1.  In this case, the value of 
G(θ) is negative when the demand volatility is low at σ  = 0.2 or σ  = 0.5, but it becomes positive 
when σ  = 1.5.  Therefore, firms that operate in changing markets should be more willing to 
invest to implement IT infrastructure in Stage 1 even if the potential cost savings are small.         
Strategic Value under Imperfect Competition 
To understand how competition affects infrastructure value, we extend our basic model to 
consider a duopoly: one firm being an IT leader and the other an IT follower.  The IT leader, 
Firm 1, has an opportunity to invest in an IT infrastructure technology.  In a window of 
opportunity, only the leader can make this investment.  We label this period as Stage 1.  At Stage 
1, Firm 1 chooses whether to implement the IT infrastructure.  Firm 2, the follower, chooses not 
to invest, due to the lack of resources.  At Stage 2, both firms observe the demand for the product 
or service that can be offered as a result.  
Demand Function.  Whether the firms decide to develop the applications depends on 
demand.  If Firm i (i = 1, 2) builds the applications to support a new product or service offering, 
it maximizes profit by setting an appropriate quality level, si (i = 1, 2).  If Firm i (1, 2) does not 
invest, it will be unable to offer the product or service, so si = 0.  If both offer the service, then 
each faces competition from the other.  To model duopoly competition with strategic IS, Barua, 
et al. (1991) introduced a cross-elasticity of substitution factor to capture inter-firm competition.  
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They interpreted this as the extent to which the services are differentiated due to non-IT factors 
(e.g., brand recognition and advertisements).  We follow this logic in representing inter-firm 
competition.  Incorporating cross-elasticity, the demand function for Firm i becomes:  
pszsd jii −⋅−= )(θ ,   where i = 1, 2 and j = 2, 1         (13) 
The cross-elasticity of substitution factor z (0 < z < 1) determines the negative effect that an 
increase in the competitor’s quality level has on each firm’s demand.  When the z is large, the 
two firms offer highly substitutable services.  A competitor’s quality will have a negative effect 
on the other’s demand.  A high z implies competition based on non-IT factors.     
Cost Functions. The cost functions for Firm 1, the market leader, are as in Equations 2 and 3 
with IT infrastructure implementation in Stage 1, and Equation 9 without IT infrastructure:  
• If Firm 1 implements at Stage 1, its investment cost is K, and the cost of providing 
quality attribute s with the IT infrastructure investment at Stage 2 is given by 1
2
1 cdfs + .   
• If Firm 1 does not implement at Stage 1, it incurs no investment cost and the modified 
cost of providing quality attribute s in the absence of the IT infrastructure, 1
2
1 cdfs +λ .   
• Meanwhile, Firm 2’s cost will be 222 cdfs +λ .   
Profit Functions.  If the IT leader Firm 1 develops the infrastructure at Stage 1, then at Stage 
2, three different scenarios can occur regarding the two firms’ investment decisions.  In the first, 
only a small group of customers desire the IT-enabled product or service.  This makes the effort 
to develop additional IT capabilities unprofitable for either firm.  As a result, neither will invest 
in Stage 2.  In the second, the market shows a moderate level of desire for the IT-enabled product 
or service quality.  Demand surpasses a certain threshold θ1 so that Firm 1 finds it attractive to 
offer the IT-enabled product or service; but Firm 2 would still lose money on it because its costs 
are higher.  Hence only Firm 1 enters the market and gains a positive return on its follow-on IT 
investment based on IT infrastructure from Stage 1.  In the third case, customers appreciate the 
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IT-enabled product quality so much that the demand for the product exceeds an even higher 
level, represented as θ2.  High demand makes it profitable for both firms to serve the market with 
additional investments in IT resources in Stage 2, although Firm 1’s profit will be reduced by the 
competition from Firm 2.  Firm 1’s profit is presented in Equation 14. 
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If Firm 1 does not take advantage of its leading position and decides not to invest in the IT 
infrastructure at Stage 1, it will compete with Firm 2 on the same level in Stage 2.  When the 
demand for IT-enabled service or product quality goes beyond a certain level, both firms will 
make a profit by making the follow-on investment.  Otherwise, neither will invest.  Firm 1’s 
profit in this situation is summarized in Equation 15.     
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Value Functions.  Again assuming the demand for the product/service quality level has a 
log-normal distribution (Equation 10), the solution for Firm 1’s value function when it makes an 
IT infrastructure investment at Stage 1 is: 
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where σ
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+=a , and Φ(●) is as before.  We can 
derive Firm 1’s value function when it does not make infrastructure investment at Stage 1:    
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+=a , σ267 −= aa , with Φ(●) again is as before.  Plugging Eq. 16 and 17 
into Eq. 9, we obtain G(θ), the IT infrastructure value.  We depict the effects of competition and 
market volatility on G(θ) with K = 3, f = c =1, p = 2,θ0 = 5, and λ = 1.1.  (See Figure 4.)  
Figure 4.  Effect of Competition on IT Infrastructure Value 
 
Note: The parameter values for the model are set as: K = 3, f = 1, p = 2, c = 1, θ0 = 5, and λ = 1.1. 
Competition and Infrastructure Value.  In Figure 4, the value of IT infrastructure, G(θ), 
increases with the extent of competition, based on the cross-elasticity of substitution, z.  That is, 
IT infrastructure becomes highly valuable when the competitor’s newly-supported product or 
service has a big negative effect on the firm’s demand or is viewed as a close substitute in the 
marketplace.  Also, Figure 4 shows that the value of G(θ) is always positive when the 
competition level is high, z = 0.4, no matter what the demand volatility is.  Instead, when the 
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level of direct competition is low, z = 0.2, G(θ) also is negative when demand volatility is low. 
But IT infrastructure value is monotonically increasing with demand volatility, so investments 
will be justified in uncertain markets.  In a competitive environment, investing in flexible IT 
infrastructure is likely to be profitable in the long run.         
Intense competition makes the capabilities of IT infrastructures more attractive, and as a 
result, firms are more willing to invest in them.  For example, Orenstein (1998) reports that in 
1998 telecomm firms were making the largest expenditures on ORB middleware projects, taking 
the leading role in adopting this IT infrastructure technology.  With deregulation in the telecomm 
and the telephone industries in the United States, however, competition among telecomm firms 
increased to the point that some would characterize it as “hypercompetition” (D’Aveni, 1995).  
Thereafter, the growth of the Internet led to the opening up of new markets.  But it also induced 
entry of competitors from other industries, such as cable TV, Internet services, and computer and 
IT companies.  Facing this hypercompetition, telecomm firms tended to appreciate the business 
value that could be derived from the scalability and heavily invested in ORB middleware. 
Interaction between Competition and Demand Volatility.  A second observation is that 
the impact of the level of product and service substitutability and interfirm competition on the 
value of IT infrastructure falls when demand volatility increases.  When it is low (i.e., a small σ), 
firms facing a high competition from substitute products (a large value of z) will find that having 
a flexible IT infrastructure is more valuable than in a mildly competitive environment.  With low 
demand volatility of σ = 0.2, the value of G(θ) increases from -0.78 to 0.34 when the cross-
elasticity of substitution level z changes from 0.1 to 0.4.  But when volatility is high, the gap in 
IT infrastructure value that will be observed between different levels of competition is greatly 
reduced.  Again, Figure 4 shows this.  With a higher demand volatility of σ  = 1.5, G(θ) 
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increases from about 0.95 to 1.33 when z changes from 0.1 to 0.4.   
Figure 4 also shows that the impact of demand volatility on infrastructure value falls when 
the competition level increases.  When the competition between firms is mild (low z), the value 
of the IT infrastructure is greatly influenced by the demand volatility.  In Figure 4, with z = 0.1, 
G(θ) jumps from -0.78 to 0.95 when demand volatility σ increases from 0.2 to 1.5.  In contrast, 
when competition is severe, the change in the IT infrastructure value caused by the change in the 
demand volatility is relatively small. The trend in Figure 4 shows that with z = 0.4, G(θ) changes 
from 0.34 to 1.33 when the demand volatility σ increases from 0.2 to 1.5.   
In Figure 4, we also observe that within a certain range, the demand volatility has a negative 
effect on infrastructure value when the competition level is high.  With z = 0.3, G(θ) decreases 
as the demand volatility goes from 0.2 to 0.6, and then goes up again if the demand volatility 
increases further.  This is because in a market where demand is relatively stable but competition 
is intense, the return on IT infrastructure decreases as the demand volatility increases.   
The complex interaction effect in Figure 4 implies that intense competition increases the 
value of infrastructure investment at an early stage as a strategy for gaining a first-mover 
advantage.  When the market is projected to have a low uncertainty in demand, it is important to 
closely monitor market competition since it makes a big difference in infrastructure value.  But 
with high uncertainty of demand, the investment decision can be made mainly based on the 
estimation of demand volatility since the competition level has little effect on the value of the 
infrastructure.  Our duopoly analysis shows that a flexible IT infrastructure brings value to the 
firm when it faces high competition or high demand volatility.  However, the extent of 
competition reduces the effect of demand volatility, and vice versa.      
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CONCLUSION 
We proposed an application of real options thinking for assessing IT infrastructure 
investments based on the characteristics of IT infrastructure, especially flexibility in creating 
new products and services that take advantage of infrastructure capabilities.   
Primary Contributions 
Investment in IT infrastructure makes organizational IS scalable in capacity and extensible in 
functionality, endowing management with flexibility and adaptability to respond to market 
changes by developing follow-on applications using the foundation of the IT infrastructure.  We 
conceptualized these capabilities as real options and argued that managers should consider the 
value of the follow-on applications.  Following the logic of previous option methods, we 
modeled flexible IT infrastructure value with a two-stage investment decision process.   
Our model considers both the cost-benefit relationship of the IT infrastructure and the market 
volatility of customer demand for follow-on investment-supported products and services in 
evaluating the IT infrastructure investment.  We use our model in two ways: (1) to study the 
effects of a skewed distribution of customer preferences (demand) on the value of the IT 
infrastructure, and (2) to show how market competition in a duopoly market is affected by 
different levels of cross-elasticity of substitution for products and services.   The cross-elasticity 
of substitution factor that we employ is a relatively direct proxy for the level of competition 
among firms.  Our analysis shows that interactions among demand volatility, the extent of the 
competition, and the cost-benefit of the technology constitute the contingencies that shape the 
business value curve of IT infrastructure.  These observations are relevant to middleware 
infrastructure technologies, which have features that give rise to growth options. 
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Managerial Implications 
The results of our analysis emphasize the need for management to identify the option-bearing 
technological features associated with IT infrastructure that can be exploited to take advantage of 
future market changes.  These IT infrastructure capabilities enable management to exert active 
management methods to adjust to market changes.  For instance, an essential feature of 
infrastructure technologies (especially middleware) is the standardized interfaces that they offer 
to make business applications and their underlying platforms interoperable.   This provides 
flexibility for adding new IS functionality and increasing system capacity at lower costs.  The 
potential value from this flexibility will be realized when a firm leverages an IT infrastructure’s 
scalability to meet market demands more effectively than its competitors.    
Management should envision applications that can release the potential for high returns from 
an infrastructure investment.  For example, banks considering implementing a middleware 
technology may try to assess its option value in the context of online banking services.  This is 
because middleware has been proven in use as a platform for effective electronic banking 
application development.   But, even though the technology is known to work, still there may be 
uncertainty with respect to demand for specific kinds of electronic banking services, for example 
the lack of a compelling business case for mobile technology-based e-banking applications.  This 
market volatility will be the source of real option-based business value.  So to develop an 
effective investment strategy, it is critical to understand where IT infrastructure capabilities will 
be more likely to impact the business in the future and to assess the potential value that can be 
generated by them. 
Our analysis also offers managerial implications for adopting IT standards, by viewing 
technological standards as part of the firm’s infrastructure (Weill and Broadbent, 1998).  
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Adopting standards may require additional investments in terms of higher development and 
training costs that are related to the infrastructure investment at Stage 1.  But it also enhances the 
firm’s ability to extend the functionality of the firm’s systems and the productivity of the IS 
department, which enables the firm to capture future business opportunities or move ahead of its 
competitors by more quickly offering new applications at a later stage.  In this sense, adopting IT 
standards creates real options for management, and the real options perspective provides an 
approach for evaluating investments in IT standards.  Accordingly, our analysis implies that IT 
standards become more valuable when demand volatility or competition is higher.  Decisions to 
adopt standards are also affected by the uncertainties that companies have to deal with when 
there are competing specifications for a common technology (Grenadier and Weiss, 1997).   
Competing specifications often modify standards value, and not always for the better. 
Besides the features of IT infrastructure technologies, senior managers should take into 
account the complex impacts that external market factors have on the potential value of IT 
infrastructure capabilities.  Specifically, the realized value of investments in IT infrastructure is 
typically a function of the cost advantage for building follow-on applications, the volatility of 
market demand for the associated product or service, and the level of competition between firms.   
The implication is clear: in assessing the potential value of IT infrastructure technologies, 
management should develop appropriate estimates of demand volatility, the effect of substitute 
products, and the interaction between these factors.   This perspective also has important 
implications for risk management.  When facing high demand uncertainty, the strategy that 
management should take is to develop the underlying infrastructure capabilities while building 
the applications later, when the critical uncertainties have been resolved.   
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Limitations and Extensions 
In spite of the new perspective and the findings that we offer, it is important to consider the 
limitations associated with this approach to IT infrastructure valuation and its emphasis on 
growth options.  First, the assumptions underlying our model allow us to consider the case of one 
attribute (e.g., quality) of one IT-enabled product or service.  But an investment in an IT 
infrastructure technology may impact more than one product or service that the firm offers, and 
multiple attributes of those products or services.  For such cases, the important issue is the 
interdependencies and interactions among these products and services, and among attributes that 
are affected.  If the products or attributes are independent from each other, we can aggregate 
their effects on attribute level (s) and demand (d).  In this case, our model and analysis remain 
valid.  But when there is a high level of interdependence, our model must be changed to 
accommodate interaction effects.  Such cases would require a portfolio management approach, as 
a recent empirical study by Bardhan, et al. (2004) suggests.  Another assumption of our model is  
the deterministic nature of the costs at Stage 2, which downplays the uncertainty involved in the 
cost factors.  This restriction needs to be relaxed if the uncertainty of costs over time is to be 
better studied.   
Second, this study focuses on the valuation of one round of infrastructure investment while in 
reality technologies evolve over time.  When technological advancement brings in a new 
generation of infrastructure technology, the value of existing infrastructure technologies is 
reduced.  Our model addresses the effect of technological evolution by adjusting the cost 
advantage ratio λ.  Specifically, technological advancement lowers λ.  The drawback of our 
model regarding technological evolution is that it treats infrastructure investments independently 
when a firm decides to upgrade its infrastructure to the new generation.  For example in moving 
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from DCOM to COM+, the firm must engage in another round of infrastructure investment.  A 
dynamic model is needed to account for the interaction effects between generations of 
technologies.  In this respect, the theoretical perspective demonstrated in Au and Kauffman 
(2001) may be helpful to reveal the value of deferring investment in an uncertain market.    
Third, our model assumes a simplified linear relationship between demand and the attribute 
level of the product or service offered, while more complicated scenarios of IT infrastructure 
investments may exhibit a nonlinear relationship when firms face dynamic market demand.  We 
hope that the present research will motivate others to follow up on our work to incorporate these 
changes and some of the other aspects of IT infrastructure investments.   
We also recognize several issues in applying this type of analysis in practice.  First, our prior 
research and consulting experience involving real option analysis has shown that it is relatively 
difficult for senior managers to properly conceptualize the range of real options that is relevant.   
Management would either underestimate or over-estimate the number of future business options.  
The problem is the lack of an appropriate stopping rule.  Second, another problem has been noted 
in recent research by Gustafson and Luft (2002), and Tallon, et al. (2002), but it continues to be 
present in the kinds of analysis that we have discussed.  At issue is the ability of senior managers 
to accurately estimate the central moments of a statistical distribution of outcomes—variance, in 
particular.   Our experience has shown that many managers do not really have a “gut feel” for the 
estimation of variance, despite their understanding of its technical definition as a statistic.   These 
issues present as a concern that relates to the applicability of real option analysis methods in 
different management, technological and market environments.   It will take a shrewd and 
perceptive senior manager, who knows the technological sources that create real options from IT 
infrastructure, and has some intuitive feel for the vagaries of the marketplace.    
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MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX  
Mathematical Representation of the Investment Value Function 
Several derivations illustrate how we arrived at the main results. Substituting Equation 7 for 
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INVESTMENTπ  in Equation 8, we represent the value function as: 
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where θ1 is the same as in Equation 6.  F(θ) is the cumulative density function and f(θ) is the probability 
density function of θ.  When θ follows the log-normal distribution ⎟⎠
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Derivation of the Value Function When Infrastructure Investment Is Made at Stage 1 
Equation A2 can be extended as follows:   
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Substituting 
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In Equation A4,
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density function of the standard normal distribution.  Using the formula for the normal integral (Patel and 
Read, 1996), we compute the integral in Equation A4 as:   
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Plugging Equation A5 into Equation A4 gives:   
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Substituting 
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where σ
σθθ )2(lnln
2
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1
−−=y , and Φ(y) is the standard normal cumulative density function.   
Plugging Equations A6 and A7 into Equation A3 yields Equation 11, as we saw earlier in this article: 
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Derivation of the Value Function When No Infrastructure Investment Made at Stage 1 
Following the same procedures, we can derive the value function for the case when no infrastructure 
investment is made at Stage 1, based on Equations 1 to 6.   We can obtain the optimal attribute level, 
sNOINVESTMENT*, and optimal Stage 2 profits, πNOINVESTMENT*, both modified with λ:  
θλf
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The Stage 2 profit when no IT infrastructure investment was made at Stage 1 is conditioned on 
whether customer demand for the product or service, θ, goes beyond a base level.  The base level demand 
is different from the base demand when the firm makes an investment at Stage 1.  We represent this base 
level as 
cp
fp
−=
λθ 4'1 .  The firm’s optimal profit at Stage 2 becomes:  
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In this case, expected value of IT investment becomes Equation 12:  
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Derivation of the Value Function in the Case of Imperfect Competition 
Similarly, we derive the value functions in the case of imperfect competition.  Firm 1’s value function 
for an infrastructure investment at Stage 1 is shown in an expansion of Equation 16:                
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Firm 1’s value function with no IT investment at Stage 1 is an expansion of Equation 17:   
                  
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −Φ−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +Φ⋅−−=
−−−−=
−−−−=
∫∫
∫
∞∞
∞
σ
σθθ
σ
σθθ
λ
θ
λ
θλ
λθσθ
σ
θθ
θ
2
)ln(
)(
2
3)ln(
4
))(21(
)]([)()]([
4
))(21(
)]([
4
)(4))(21(),(
22
30
22
30
2
0
2
lnln
2
2
22
01
2
33
3
cpp
f
ecpz
xNdcppxNde
f
cpz
Fd
f
cpfpcpzV
x
NTNOINVESTME
 
